Sodomy laws and gender variance in Tahiti and Hawai‘i by Zanghellini, Aleardo
Sodomy laws and gender variance in 
Tahiti and Hawai‘i 
Article 
Published Version 
Open Access 
Zanghellini, A. (2013) Sodomy laws and gender variance in 
Tahiti and Hawai‘i. Laws, 2 (2). pp. 51­68. ISSN 2075­471X 
doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/laws2020051 (Special Issue: 
Legally Constructed Gendered Identities) Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/33118/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://www.mdpi.com/2075­471X/2/2/51 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/laws2020051 
Publisher: MDPI 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Laws 2013, 2, 51–68; doi:10.3390/laws2020051 
 
laws
ISSN 2075-471X 
www.mdpi.com/journal/laws 
Article 
Sodomy Laws and Gender Variance in Tahiti and Hawai‘i 
Aleardo Zanghellini 
School of Law, University of Reading, Foxhill House, Whiteknights Road, Earley, Reading,  
RG67BA, UK; E-Mail: a.zanghellini@reaing.ac.uk; Tel.: +44-118-378-5387 
Received: 19 February 2013; in revised form: 3 April 2013 / Accepted: 3 April 2013 /  
Published: 9 April 2013 
 
Abstract: In both Hawaiian and Tahitian, the central meaning of mahu denotes  
gender-variant individuals, particularly male-bodied persons who have a significant 
investment in femininity. However, in Hawai‘i, unlike Tahiti, the word mahu is now more 
commonly used as an insult against gay or transgender people. The negative connotation of 
the term in Hawaiian indexes lower levels of social acceptability for mahu identity on 
O‘ahu (Hawai‘i’s most populous island) as compared to Tahiti. The article argues that 
these differences are partly due to a historical legacy of sexually repressive laws. The 
article traces the history of sodomy laws in these two Polynesian societies and argues that 
this history supports the hypothesis that sodomy laws (in conjunction with such social 
processes as urbanisation and Christianisation) are partially to blame for the diminished 
social status of mahu on O‘ahu. A different social and legal history in Tahiti accounts for 
the fact that the loss of social status experienced by Tahitian mahu has been lesser than that 
of their Hawaiian counterparts.  
Keywords: Hawai‘i; Tahiti; French Polynesia; O‘ahu; sodomy; mahu; transgender; gender 
variance; gender identity; sodomy laws 
 
1. Introduction 
Visitors to the Hawaiian island of O‘ahu are likely, sooner or later, to come across the ‘Stones of 
life’—four large boulders on Kuhio Beach in Waikiki. As the plaque at the site explains, according to 
legend the boulders were placed there hundreds of years ago, on the occasion of the departure from 
Hawai‘i of four healers who had come from Raiatea. Raiatea, located several thousand miles south of 
Hawai‘i and famed as the spiritual centre of Polynesia, is, after nearby Tahiti, the largest among 
French Polynesia’s Society Islands. Although the plaque at Kuhio Beach omits to state it, according to 
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oral history the four healers who came to Hawai‘i from Raiatea were māhū [1]. In other words, they 
were what we would today call gender-variant. 
Although the term māhū may be applied to gender-variant female-bodied individuals in Tahitian [2], 
and to same-sex attracted people (regardless of gender) in Hawaiian [3], in either language the central 
meaning of the word denotes male-bodied persons of Polynesian descent who have a significant 
investment in femininity. This may be displayed by such features as the donning of female attire, the 
preference for consorting with women, the adoption of feminine mannerisms, or the performance of 
women’s work. This terminological commonality, however, is deceiving. For, as Matzner puts it, in 
Hawai‘i the word māhū has now ‘lost its cultural salience to such an extent that it has become an insult 
to throw at gay or transgender people’ ([1], p. 280).  
The different connotations that the word māhū has in Tahitian and Hawaiian reflect greater levels of 
social acceptability accorded to māhū identity in Tahiti as compared to O‘ahu, despite the fact that 
Hawai‘i is often touted as one of the most liberal of the United States when it comes to attitudes 
towards sexuality and gender-variance. While even in Tahiti the attitude towards māhū is best 
described as one of ambivalence [4] and while it has been argued that māhū are accorded ‘apparent 
relative acceptance’ ([5], p. 329) amongst native Hawaiians (and, at any rate, more toleration than 
trans people enjoy in the Western world) [5], the mainstream visibility of māhū in Papeete has no 
match in Honolulu. As Ellingson and Odo put it, ‘postcolonial acculturation has resulted in notable 
stigma for transgender individuals in Hawai’i today’ ([6], p. 558). In this article I propose to analyse 
the contribution that law has made to bringing about this state of affairs.  
The main reason why this question matters should be clear: the diminished social status of māhū on 
O‘ahu is a social justice problem that calls for analysis. However, the subject matter of this article is 
significant also for instrumental reasons: in particular, it provides a compelling case study to 
investigate the role that law plays in influencing the construction of gender and sexual identities. There 
is a growing body of work addressing, and sometimes foregrounding, the question of how law is 
productive of sexual and gender identities, focusing on the historically-situated ways in which 
particular legal dynamics have precipitated the emergence of, or facilitated changes to, certain sexual 
or gender subjectivities, particularly homosexuality [7–10]. This article aims to make a contribution to 
this literature, extending its concerns to Polynesian gender-variant identities, specifically those of 
Hawaiian and Tahitian māhū.  
My argument will be that sodomy laws have contributed to the discursive sexualisation of māhū 
identity on O‘ahu in a way that has not occurred in Tahiti. I will further argue that this sexualisation, in 
combination with other factors, has made māhū a more socially problematic identity, and probably a 
more difficult one to inhabit, on contemporary O‘ahu than in present-day Tahiti. In other words, the 
sexualisation of māhū identity on O‘ahu has resulted in an impairment in māhū’s social status. Some of 
the factors that, together with the discursive sexualisation of māhū identity, have brought about this 
state of affairs on O‘ahu include the importation after colonisation of a Christian sexual morality 
suspicious of all forms of non-procreative sexuality, as well as the larger proportion of non-Polynesian 
settlers in Hawai‘i, who do not share in the pre-colonial indigenous epistemologies accepting of 
gender-variance and same-sex sexuality. 
My argument in this article is that there is a good fit between historical developments and the 
hypothesis that law is partially to be blamed for the diminished social status of māhū on O‘ahu via the 
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discursive sexualisation of their identity. But I want to go further, and claim that an explanation that 
makes law part of the picture is not only consistent with historical facts, but also highly plausible at the 
theoretical level. First, as Merry argues and illustrates in the most significant work to date on the role 
of law in facilitating the colonisation of Hawai‘i, law, as a meaning-making system, is ‘fundamental to 
understanding the shape of social transformation’, although the latter is also driven by material 
practices ([11], p. 259). Secondly, law has a peculiar power to effect socio-cultural transformation by 
creating and redefining social meanings, as it can rely not only on its coercive power, but also on its 
nature as an authoritative discourse [11]. 
2. Māhū on O‘ahu and in Tahiti 
For scholars of gender-variance, Polynesian societies offer particularly rich case studies. In 1994 
Besnier published an essay seeking to identify common features in the phenomenology of different 
instances of what he calls Polynesian (male-bodied) ‘gender liminality’, understood as ‘the adoption 
by certain individuals of attributes associated with a gender’ other than that most frequently attached to 
their bodily sex—something that he argues ‘is deeply embedded in dynamics of Polynesian cultures 
and societies’ ([12], p. 285). According to Besnier, the best understanding ‘posits liminal individuals 
as men who borrow certain social and cultural attributes and symbols normally associated with 
women’ ([12], p. 327). He notes that these attributes vary from one individual to the other; that  
cross-dressing is not a reliable indicator of gender liminality; and that gender liminal individuals in 
Polynesia typically associate, and are associated, with women and domesticity. He also argues that 
Polynesian gender liminality is an internally variable category, that it may wax and wane according to 
context and that gender-liminal individuals may transition to gender non-liminality [12]. 
In the Tahitian context, Levy suggested that māhū enable Polynesian men to consolidate their 
masculinity in a cultural environment characterized by ‘the absence of strong internal shaping towards 
the self definition of manhood in its sense of contrast and complementarity to womanhood’ ([13], p. 18). 
In other words, gender-conforming Polynesian men would be able to shore up a sense of male identity 
because they can contrast it with the ‘failed’ masculinity of the māhū. This functionalist account has 
been critiqued on the ground, among other things, that it is predicated upon a purported and unproven 
Tahitian preoccupation with gender deviance and masculinity [14], and that it does not explain why the 
absence of a strong contrast between male and female identities is a problem in need of a solution [12]. 
Although sexual relations with men are not an invariable feature of Polynesian gender liminality, 
sexuality remains, alongside gender, centrally relevant to an accurate understanding of gender 
liminality. This is because, Besnier argues, gender liminal individuals are always liable to being 
perceived as ‘potential sexual “fair game”’ of non-liminal males ([12], p. 301). In other words, the 
social intelligibility of gender liminal individuals in Polynesia rests as much on their gender variance 
as on an assumption of their participation in same-sex sexual activity. It is worth noting that these 
understandings are not necessarily at odds with the ways in which Euro-Western dominant 
epistemologies ‘make sense’ of transgender people. Thus, Sharpe has pointed out that the law tends to 
render invisible non-normative transgender desire—for example, a transgender woman’s desire for 
another individual who, whether or not female-bodied, identifies as a woman [15]. 
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At any rate, this slippage from gender to sexuality in the social legibility of Polynesian gender-variance 
is borne out linguistically in Hawai‘i: not only, as we have seen, on O‘ahu māhū is currently used as a 
disparaging term applied to both trans and gay individuals, but Pukui’s authoritative Hawaiian 
dictionary translates the term into English as ‘homosexual’ and ‘hermaphrodite’ [3]. Clearly, neither of 
these English terms accurately captures the distinctiveness of Polynesian gender-variance: they do 
indicate, however, that māhū identity is thought of both in terms of sex/gender hybridity and in terms 
of same-sex sexual orientation. 
While Besnier’s remarks purport to apply to Polynesian gender-variant individuals across the whole 
of Polynesia, there are important differences in the construction of Polynesian gender variance in 
different Polynesian societies. In this article I am especially interested in the disparities in social status 
between Tahitian and Hawaiian māhū—disparities that entail different occupational prospects as well 
as different levels of integration into mainstream kinship structures.  
Perhaps one of the most powerful illustrations of the integration of Tahitian māhū people into 
mainstream kinship structures is their involvement as parents in traditional adoption arrangements—
something that, although only recently documented, is not an infrequent occurrence [4]. This reflects 
their relatively full integration into French Polynesian society, including their participation in the 
mainstream economy—despite the gendered nature of the occupations they tend to take up, which 
confirms the cultural association of māhū with women’s work. In particular, Tahitian māhū people 
often work in the hospitality industry, as social workers and nurses, or as administrators [16].  
Anecdotal evidence on Hawaiian māhū on O‘ahu—the most developed island in Hawai‘i, and seat 
of the State capital Honolulu—paints rather a different picture of their role in both the public and 
private spheres. Consider the following quote from the website of an organisation devoted to 
improving ‘the quality of life for mahuwahine’ (note that because the term ‘māhū’ in Hawai‘i is now 
often used in a disparaging way, some prefer to it the more recently coined word ‘mahuwahine’). In 
2009 this is how the website described the living conditions of Hawaiian māhū:  
Not fully accepted in today's mainstream economy, mahuwahine have maintained a subculture of survival 
through welfare/SSI supplemented by hustling, drag entertainment, small jobs and care giving for children 
and the elderly [17]. 
After the website’s update in 2010, the issues of social disadvantage was put in less stark terms, but 
the mourning for a loss in social status and familial roles is clearly conveyed: 
We had a place in traditional Hawaiian society along with every other Hawaiian… We were judged by how 
well we served our families and how we lived up to our kuleana (responsibility). In the 21st century, we 
constantly need to reinvent our place… ([17], accessed on 23 October 2012). 
While it could be wondered whether the organisation on whose website these statements appeared 
was forced to paint a particularly bleak picture by the imperative to secure funding for the services it 
provided to mahuwahine, the organization’s perspective actually accords with other indicators of the 
diminished opportunities faced by mahu on O‘ahu. Thus, in the conclusions of a book that gathers the 
voices of a number of transgender people living on O‘ahu, Matzner states: 
Rather than claiming their places in society as healers, caregivers, or teachers [that is, the occupations 
traditionally assigned to māhū in Hawai‘i], many present-day queens on O‘ahu must work the streets in 
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order to survive. … [M]any families in Hawai‘i today fail to recognize the specialness of their transgendered 
children and instead view them as worthy only of condemnation… Almost all of the locally raised 
participants in this book worked in sex-work at one time or another... For queens living in a hostile society, 
sex work … is oftentimes the only available path to take… In addition to sex work, “traditional” career 
choices for queens have been in the beauty and entertainment industries … [although] female impersonation 
is a sideline rather than a full-time profession ([1], p. 284). 
It bears emphasising that different māhū on O‘ahu have diverse experiences and clearly not all 
māhū are employed in sex work or even confined to low-paying occupations. Furthermore, where 
Matzner argues that for many māhū on O‘ahu sex work ‘is the only available path to take’ he may be 
overstating the point: for the interviewees in his own book convey a clear sense of agency, variously 
accounting for their participation in sex-work as stemming, for example, from a desire to get the sexual 
attentions of boys, or as a strategic choice to make money fast so as to be able to afford the hormones 
that they want to take [1]. What is clear, however, is that these choices are constrained by a context—
whose nature is not only material, but also discursive—that the agents themselves had no hand  
in producing.  
Even with these qualifications in mind, Matzner’s account points to a significant difference in the 
social status generally enjoyed by māhū on O‘ahu as compared to Tahiti. In the last decade or so, some 
studies have begun to document more systematically the diminished opportunities and challenges 
Hawai‘ian māhū face [5]. These include: high levels of violence in schools [18]; the fact that māhū 
‘are routinely underemployed; are at risk for HIV, incarceration and substance abuse; experience 
severe stigmatisation and harassment; generally lack access to healthcare; and are at exceptional risk 
for early mortality’ [19]. Socio-linguistic evidence confirms this difference in the social status of māhū 
in Tahiti and on O‘ahu: as we have seen, in Tahiti ‘māhū’ has retained its original meaning, while on 
O‘ahu it has acquired a pejorative connotation. 
At one level, the contemporary marginality of māhū on O’ahu is productive of rich counter-normative 
practices, including performative kinship structures: for example, more experienced māhū who have 
been out for longer play the role of ‘queen mothers’ towards newcomers. As a young māhū explained: 
‘A queen mother is someone who is there for you in your time of need’ ([1], p. 264). Nonetheless, the 
marginality of Hawaiian māhū remains a social justice problem that calls for interrogation.  
3. Methodological Notes 
There is no doubt that a complex set of factors accounts for the different trajectory taken by 
Polynesian gender variance on O‘ahu and in Tahiti. Indeed, it may well be that those differences are 
overdetermined: more than one factor is likely to be implicated in their production, and each, or at least 
some, of these factors may well in and of itself have been sufficient to produce the outcome. I am 
interested in the question of whether law was one of these factors.  
While it is impossible to empirically demonstrate a causal correlation between the law and the 
impaired social status of māhū on O‘ahu, in this article I raise that correlation as a hypothesis that can 
be ‘deepened and broadened’ ([20], p. 12) (if not irrefutably tested) by undertaking a comparative 
analysis between the sociolegal history of Tahiti and O‘ahu. Two objections might be raised to  
this analysis.  
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First, one could wonder whether the differences in the level of acceptance experienced by māhū in 
Tahiti and on O‘ahu might be largely due to the fact that O‘ahu has undergone a process of 
modernisation and a correlative loss of traditional values which is unparalleled in Tahiti, whose 
population is six times smaller than O‘ahu. One could then go on to wonder if it might be more 
appropriate to compare Tahiti with the whole of Hawaii, including the more rural and less densely 
populated islands, where pre-colonial Hawaiian values sympathetic to gender-variance are more likely 
to have survived.  
I think this way of proceeding would be less promising than a comparison between specifically 
O‘ahu and Tahiti. Despite the difference in overall population numbers between Tahiti and O‘ahu, the 
population and infrastructure in Papeete, though admittedly not as large as those of Honolulu, reach the 
critical mass point that make the city feel and function as a thoroughly urban, modern and 
cosmopolitan environment. This makes Tahiti stand into considerable contrast to the rest of French 
Polynesia: consistent with this, in the local imagination Papeete no less than Honolulu functions as the 
main referent for a metropolitan environment.  
In this respect, the relationship between Tahiti ‘and her islands’ is largely analogous to that between 
O‘ahu and the rest of Hawaii: in either case, we have an island dominated by a city with all the 
trappings of modern life, standing out from the other islands where life has a largely more slow-paced, 
rural and traditional quality. In sum, it seems to me that the similar structure/function of 
O‘ahu/Honolulu and Tahiti/Papeete are more important than the sheer numbers of their respective 
populations in determining the appropriate terms of comparison for the study. 
A second objection runs as follows. The majority of the population of French Polynesia is of 
Polynesian descent, while native Hawaiians are a minority in Hawai‘i. Even if in Tahiti the proportion 
of non-Polynesians is considerably greater than in the rest of French Polynesia [21], Polynesians 
remain a majority in Tahiti and a minority on O‘ahu [22]. This makes a comparison between the two 
ill-conceived. 
The problem with this line of argument is that it is built on the assumption that the only factor that 
explains the diminished opportunites of māhū on O‘ahu are the transphobic attitudes held by  
non-Polynesians. While it seems highly plausible that these attitudes are a major contributing cause of 
anti-māhū stigma, assuming at the outset that they are all that matters disables us from even 
considering whether other factors may be involved, and hence obscures the role that these factors may 
have played. 
If we resist the temptation to assume that the differences in ethnic composition of O‘ahu’s and 
Tahiti’s populations explain everything (and they do not explain, for example, the reports of some 
Hawaiian māhū that they experience abuse within their families [5]), then these differences need not be 
seen as fatal to the potential usefulness of a comparative analysis between the two societies.  
4. Māhū, Same-Sex Sexuality, and Sodomy Laws 
The laws of some Polynesian societies specifically target gender-variance: in particular, Farran and 
Su’a report that in both Samoa and Tonga female impersonation is criminalized, although Tongan law 
expressly limits this to situations where the impersonation is for the purpose of soliciting [23].  
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Similarly, for some time after the mid-sixties, Honolulu City Council required trans women in an 
area of town frequented by māhū to wear a badge identifying their male sex [1,24]. It seems clear that 
this requirement, and the police’s violent enforcement of it [24], contributed to anti-māhū stigma on 
O‘ahu. Not only was the requirement hostile to the self-understanding of those on whom it was 
imposed, but it also socially stigmatised māhū as dangerous bearers of an inauthentic gender identity. 
There were also racist undercurrents to the requirement, pitting as it did the supposedly devious and 
predatory māhū sex-workers (in all likelihood the principal target of the provision, even if this was on 
its face race- and profession-neutral) to their ‘innocent’ and ‘unsuspecting’ customers—the  
non-Polynesian soldiers or tourists unfamiliar with Hawaiian gender-variance, whom the māhū were 
supposedly intent on deceiving and taking advantage of.  
I want to concentrate, however, on a less obvious legal contributor to the diminished social status of 
mahu on O‘ahu: Hawai‘i’s (now repealed) sodomy laws. Sodomy laws spring naturally to mind as one 
of the symbolically most powerful contributors to stigma against LGBT people. While some scholars 
(Calhoun) have questioned that sexually repressive laws (as opposed to, for example, marriage laws) 
are mainly responsible for the disempowerment of non-heterosexual or gender-nonconforming people, 
the claim that sexually repressive laws socially stigmatise sexual minorities has a simplicity that it is 
profoundly counterintuitive to argue with. Furthermore, it fits the post-Foucauldian theoretical 
argument, made most famously by Smart [25]—and, in the queer context, by Moran [9]—that much of 
the power of law is exercised through its ability to make authoritative claims to truth.  
While gender rather than sexuality is seen as the main defining feature of māhū, I have pointed out 
above that, as Wallace clearly puts it, in Polynesia gender variance ‘announces the availability of 
gender-liminal subjects for same-sex sexual acts whether or not they participate in them’ ([26], p. 26). 
As such, one would expect sodomy laws to have played some role in socially de-legitimising māhū 
identity. The legal history of sodomy in Hawai‘i and Tahiti fits this hypothesis.   
Two disclaimers are in order. First, at no point will I claim that law is solely responsible for the 
diminished social status of māhū on O‘ahu. However, as Matsuda puts is, ‘[o]f the many economic, 
political, and social effects that were destructive of Hawaiian culture, the law, with its official 
institutional presence, was surely one of those forces. It was not possible for Hawaiians to use Western 
law instrumentally while resisting Western law ideologically’ ([27], p. 37). Secondly, I will not 
venture an opinion about whether law alone—in absence, that is, of any other concurring factor—
could have been enough to produce the outcome. That question would be of purely theoretical interest, 
for, as matter of fact, other relevant factors appear to have played a role. 
5. Sodomy Laws on O‘ahu 
The existence and acceptability of same-sex relationships and sexual activities between males is 
well documented in pre-Christian Hawaii [11]. In particular, early European accounts testify to the 
presence of male companions (aikane) of chiefs who, unlike māhū, appear to have had a standard 
masculine gender presentation, and who had sexual as well as important political roles [28]. Aikane 
relationships, however, were frowned upon by the missionaries [29], and same-sex intimacy was 
largely clouded in invisibility after Western contact [30]. 
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As Hawai‘i gradually lost its independence, going from sovereign Kingdom to Republic (1894) to 
US Territory (1898–1900) to US State (1959), its laws became progressively imbued with ‘non-Hawaiian 
ways’ ([30], p. 113). The history of sodomy laws on the islands, reconstructed by Painter [31] and 
Morris [30], illustrates this trajectory.  
Merry argues that the management of sexuality was a central concern of the ruling elites in XIX 
century Hawai‘i and that it was ‘driven by Christian demands for conversion’ ([11], p. 16); but such 
demands should themselves be placed in the context of the ruling elite’s attempt at forging a ‘civilised’ 
Hawaiian nation that would be taken seriously in the international arena, dominated by Euro-American 
powers. The Hawaiian political leadership was also under pressure to manage these cultural changes 
specifically using the medium of law, for the acquisition of a system of rules that Euro-American 
observers could apprehend as ‘law’ was seen as a mark of a mature civilization. Thus, the ‘adoption of 
Anglo-American law was inextricably joined with the adoption of … a severe Calvinist version of 
Protestant Christianity brought by stern, impassioned, and ethnocentric missionaries from New 
England’ ([11], p. 63). Indeed, in the 1820s the Ten Commandments were adopted as the law of the 
land. As a result of this and subsequent initiatives, laws criminalized sexual practices that had hitherto been 
legally and socially acceptable, and people started being prosecuted for engaging in such practices [11].  
Sodomy laws as such (incorporating the common law definition) were not introduced until 1850 [32]. 
At first blush, the timing may seem ironic, as by this time the Hawaiian political leadership had started 
replacing the missionary-inspired theocratic legal system with a secular legal system. However, the 
timing of the introduction of the sodomy law can be explained by the fact that it is precisely during this 
phase of secularisation of the legal system (1844–1852) that many radical changes were introduced 
into Hawaiian law [11].  
Importantly, the secularisation of the legal system during this period, and the considerable 
substantive normative changes that it brought in its wake (including in the realm of sexual practices), 
were partly introduced in a bid to continue shoring up the Kingdom’s political independence in the 
face of imperialist threats. However, the strategy backfired, for the numerous prosecutions for sexual 
crimes that followed the introduction of sexually repressive laws created the image of a nation whose 
members were incapable of self-restraint and hence self-government [11]. 
The sodomy law was introduced as part of a Criminal Code whose provisions, albeit intended to be 
tailored to fit Hawaiian needs and conditions, were merely a simplified version of those contained in a 
Code that had been proposed for Massachusetts a few years before [11]. The English text of the 1850 
law referred to sodomy, as ‘the crime against nature, either with mankind or any beast’. To render the 
first part of this expression (‘the crime against nature … with mankind’), the Hawaiian text used the 
expression ‘moe aikane’, translated by Morris as ‘one who sleeps with a lover of the same sex’ ([30], 
p. 114): the idea that by engaging in sodomy one commits a crime against nature was not linguistically 
representable in Hawaiian and alien to indigenous epistemologies.  
The discrepancy between the wording of the English and Hawaiian versions of the statute raises 
interesting questions about the law’s purpose and exactly which conduct it was meant to proscribe: the 
Hawaiian wording (moe aikane) here seems crucial, for case law from the 1850s through to the 1890s 
established the principle that in case of conflict between two versions of a law, the Hawaiian version 
would prevail [30].  
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Morris points out that the word ‘aikane’ describes people, not acts and ‘marks persons of any 
gender in a homogamous relationship’ ([30], p. 128). ‘Moe’ does refer to an act—that of lying (as in 
mating) with another—but, unlike the English idea of ‘unnatural crime’ does not necessarily index anal 
(or oral) intercourse [30]. So, potentially, the Hawaiian expression moe aikane was broader than the 
English idea of sodomy, as it could be seen as encompassing acts between women (as well as between 
men), and as applying to a greater variety of sexual acts than sodomy as conventionally understood. In 
terms of its enforcement, however, all of the 7 prosecutions relating to cases not involving intercourse 
with animals that took place in the second half of the XIX century were in fact for male-to-male 
(forcible) sodomy [30].  
Interestingly, neither as written nor as applied did the law formally prohibit one from becoming a 
same-sex lover: rather, it targeted sexual acts between such lovers. Indeed, as the case law on forcible 
sodomy shows, the law in practice was used to prohibit sexual acts between people of the same-sex 
whether or not they were intimate companions or lovers (aikane). In other words, despite the wording 
of the Hawaiian version, in practice the law formally operated like other sodomy laws, remaining tied 
to particular acts, rather than specific identities or relationships. 
There is evidence that after Euro-Americans settled on the islands, Hawaiians no longer openly 
engaged in same-sex sexual activity [30]. Aikane could then become, at least ostensibly, a  
de-sexualised category—something akin to a bosom or best friend. The fact that, at the same time as 
sodomy laws proscribed lying with an aikane, aikane were recognised as members of family in probate 
proceedings [30] was possible, I suggest, precisely to the extent that the category aikane was 
discursively de-sexualised. In turn, this de-sexualisation was possible inasmuch as Hawaiians 
responded to Euro-American and Christian condemnation of same-sex sexual activity and relationships 
by something akin to closeting—which, as we have seen above, is just what aikane did. This closeting 
strategy however, as I will argue below, was not available to māhū, if Besnier is right in arguing that 
their very gender presentation in and of itself triggers the social assumption that they engage in  
same-sex sexual activity [12]. 
In 1887 the sodomy law was entrenched in the so-called ‘Bayonet Constitution’ [30], which was 
forcibly imposed on King Kalakaua by the Hawaiian League, a secret society made up mainly of 
foreign residents who aspired for the Kingdom of Hawai‘i’s to be annexed to the United States. The 
Hawai‘i Supreme Court took a particularly hard stance on sodomy in two cases from the 1920s [31]: 
against the authority of English law, it held that emission of semen need not be proven in sodomy 
cases [33] and that fellatio amounted to sodomy [34].  
Preoccupations with deviant sexual conduct intensified in the 1940s, with the introduction in the 
Hawaiian Senate of two Bills aiming at creating a ‘psychopathic offender law’, intended to target, 
amongst others, sexual psychopaths (although the Bills were eventually rejected). Furthermore, in 
1949 a provision outlawing solicitation ‘for the purpose of committing a crime against nature’ was 
adopted (Laws of Hawai‘i 1949, ch 139, §1, enacted 4 May, 1949) [31].  
In 1972 the 1850 sodomy law and the 1949 solicitation provision were finally repealed on the 
ground that they served ‘no social function’ ([31], p. 116). As late as 1982, however, the Hawai‘i 
Supreme Court stated in State v Mueller [35] that same-sex sexual activity was not protected conduct 
under the 1978 right to privacy amendment to the Hawai‘i Constitution. This meant that the legislature 
could re-introduce sodomy laws without violating the State Constitution [31]—or indeed the US 
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Constitution, under which, according to the infamous 1986 case Bowers v Hardwick [36], there was no 
right to engage in same-sex sexual activity. 
All this does not necessarily mean that sodomy laws were frequently enforced. Although in the 
1850s and 1860s Hawaiian courts ‘were full of cases concerning sexual conduct, particularly adultery 
and fornication’ ([11], p. 221), the records indicate that prosecutions for sodomy were infrequent at the 
time of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i—as we have seen above, only seven cases are recorded. Additionally, 
to the extent that prosecutions occurred in this period, all except one were concentrated after 1875, ‘the 
era when sexual repression of Hawai‘i under foreign influence, particularly anti-sodomy sentiment, 
was most severe’ ([30], p. 131). Nor do we know that the sodomy laws were necessarily used to 
disproportionately target māhū, although we do have evidence of the Police using them to arrest māhū 
in the decade prior to their repeal [1].  
Whatever the extent of their enforcement, these laws contributed to the creation and consolidation 
of particular social meanings around same-sex sexual activity. They did so because of law’s nature as 
an authoritative discourse making claims to truth, and its ability to shape our apprehension of the social 
and inflect our value judgments about it [11,25]. I am not appealing here to an understanding of formal 
law as structuring our worldview in some simple or irresistible way, but to an idea of enacted law as 
productive of ‘legal consciousness’ [37], by which I mean the constrained ways in which actors 
engage with law and its legal categories, including beyond the courtroom and police station, and 
including at the psychic and inter-subjective level of identity construction.  
It seems more than accident, in this connection, that in the 1860s—the decade following that during 
which the first sodomy law was introduced—The Hawaiian flag ran articles condemning historical 
Hawaiian figures known for their same-sex sexual activity or preference, and blaming them for all 
manner of disturbances and ill-consequences befalling the Kingdom (although, as Silva’s work 
demonstrates, it does not follow that the law and the imported Christian morality succeeded in 
altogether monopolising the terms of discourses surrounding same-sex desire) [38].  
Sodomy laws, understood in this way (that is not necessarily as practically enforced by legal 
officials but as constitutive of legal consciousness), are likely to have had a disproportionate 
stigmatising effect on māhū. For, unlike gender-conforming males who have sex with males, the 
gender presentation of māhū, as we have seen above, automatically triggers the social assumption 
(which may in fact be unfounded) of their engaging in same-sex (albeit different-gender) sexual activity. 
The fact that māhū’s gender presentation signals a putative participation in same-sex sexual activity, 
coupled with the fact that sodomy laws for 120 years made such activity an ‘infamous crime’ [39], is 
likely to have resulted, over time, in māhū subjectivity becoming socially intelligible largely in terms 
of sexual deviance. This is especially likely to have occurred on O‘ahu, where urbanisation and 
westernisation created the conditions for the increased juridification of social and psychic life 
(although Merry points out that even in urban areas the old tended to interact with, rather than simply 
being replaced by, the new [11]). 
In a society in which since the early XIX century the missionaries had made it their business to 
introduce and popularise Christian sexual morality—a morality whose value-judgements also 
inevitably informed the outlook of much of the expanding Euro-American population of the island 
through the XIX and XX centuries—the sexualisation of māhū identity cannot fail to have contracted 
the social opportunities previously afforded to māhū. To the extent that this was so, and to the extent 
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that the sexualisation of māhū identity may have been internalised or deliberately drawn upon as a 
resource by māhū themselves, it is little wonder that ‘prostitution [became] a dominant way of life 
within local transgender communities’ on O‘ahu ([1], p. 283), where tourism, the military bases, and 
the trappings of urban life ensured a steady supply of customers.  
The urban and cosmopolitan environment of Honolulu, coupled with māhū people’s reduced 
opportunities for full social participation, also brought māhū into direct contact with gender and sexual 
sub-cultures from the mainland. This, while providing opportunities for alliances, may have 
precipitated more or less subtle shifts and realignments in māhū identity and practices—signalled, for 
example, by the use of hormones on the part of some māhū [1]. I hypothesise that this adoption of 
‘alien’ gender identity practices may have resulted in a social reappraisal, by some, of the  
Hawaiian character of māhū identity, contributing to its social de-legitimisation as ‘inauthentic’ within 
Hawaiian communities. 
While gender-normative same-sex attracted people no doubt also felt the sting of the sodomy 
statutes, many of them would have been able to escape the associated pressures to a greater extent than 
māhū did. This is precisely on account of their conventional gender presentation. Consistent with this, 
and on the assumption that participation in mainstream kinship practices is an indicator of social 
integration, we have contemporary anecdotal evidence of gender-normative same-sex lovers raising 
children in the context of traditional adoption [40]. 
6. Sodomy Laws in Tahiti 
If Hawai‘i, before the 1972 repeal, had a long-term relationship with sodomy laws, by comparison 
Tahiti had merely a fleeting affair. Prior to Western contact, Tahitians, like Hawaiians, engaged freely 
in same-sex sexual practices. In particular, Oliver reports from sources speaking of sexual relations 
between boys and older males of higher status [41]. Furthermore, the missionaries decried the 
pervasiveness of sexual activities between young boys [12]. Levy has also reported from a document 
in the archives of the London Missionary Society, describing how in 1801 the Chief Hapi-ano was 
found fellating another man [42]. Oliver also states that ‘there is evidence that males in general 
indulged occasionally in homosexual practices including mutual masturbation and other unspecified 
acts’ ([41], p. 373). Finally, commentators agree that although taio (friendship) contracts between 
males in ancient Tahiti were probably not entered into with a view to establishing same-sex sexually 
intimate relationships (however much they may have resembled marriage ceremonies), contract-friends, 
as well as many other males, may well have engaged in same-sex sexual activity [43]. 
The first set of written laws in Tahiti was promulgated in 1819 by King Pomare II. According to 
Bouge, the Pomare Code of 1819, drafted by the King and chiefs in consultation with members of the 
London Missionary Society (the first organised European presence in Tahiti), was the result of a 
converge of wills—one Tahitian and one English [44]. Campbell emphasises King Pomare II’s 
motivations in this process: having recently defeated his opponents and gained control of the Island, he 
saw a code of law as instrumental to retaining and effectively exercising power [45]. The King, having 
converted to Christianity in 1812 [46] and wishing to use it as a basis for a new social order, sought the 
advice of the missionaries [45]. According to Campbell the missionaries were less than enthusiastic 
about becoming involved in lawmaking, even as simple advisers, and ‘insisted that the King make his 
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own laws’ ([45], p. 76). According to other accounts, however, it was the missionaries themselves that 
instigated the drafting and promulgation of the Code [47,48], which they thought could serve as a 
means of moral reform [44].  
While the missionaries’ influence on the content of the Code is undeniable—indeed, some have 
argued, greater than they were prepared to concede [47]—the Code was, in the words of Reverend 
William Ellis from the London Missionary Society, ‘not altogether such as the Missionaries would 
have wished the nation to adopt’ ([46], p. 137). In fact, the King did not always follow the 
missionaries’ advice, giving them reason to lament the narrow scope of the laws introduced [45]. 
In this regard, the absence of an offence targeting same-sex sexuality in the 1819 Pomare Code 
seems telling, particularly in light of the fact that other sexual or sexualised conduct to which the new 
Christian morality objected was outlawed: this included adultery and the provocative gesture of 
striking one’s thigh—apparently an indecent behaviour condemned by the new religion [44].  
The absence of an anti-sodomy law from the Pomare Code of 1819 is even more striking in light of 
the fact that same-sex sexual activity was almost certainly prohibited in the Code of laws promulgated 
in the 1820s in another island in the archipelago of the Society Islands—Huahine. The Huahine Code 
contained a provision prescribing 7 years of incessant hard labour or perpetual banishment for those 
who committed an unspecified ‘unnatural crime’ ([47], p. 182). 
Under these circumstances, the simplest explanation for the absence of a sodomy provision from the 
1819 Pomare Code is that the criminalization of same-sex sexual activity was one of those issues on 
which Pomare II deliberately failed to heed the missionaries’ advice. I suggest that one of the reasons 
Pomare may have had for choosing not to prohibit sodomy is that he himself had sexual relations with 
other males: in the words of the missionaries, King Pomare was ‘addicted to … debasing vices’ ([47], 
p. 258) and Oliver reports that the missionaries were first-hand and unwilling witnesses to the same-sex 
relationship between the King and one Toetoe [41].  
On the other hand it appears that the missionaries’ influence on the Huahine Code was greater, 
which explains its inclusion of the ‘unnatural crime’ offence: one Mr Barff prided himself to have 
devoted ‘a greater degree of … attention’ to the Huahine Code than to any of the other laws enacted in 
the Society Islands at the time ([46], p. 193).  
Even after the death of Pomare II, it seems that no sodomy/‘unnatural crime’ offence was 
introduced in Tahiti for quite some time. In their discussion of the innovations of the 1824 Code—
which revised and added to the provisions of the 1819 Code [49]—Tyerman and Bennett make no 
mention of such an offence being introduced [50].  
In 1842, however—the same year Tahiti became a French Protectorate—a new Code [51] was 
promulgated. The missionaries themselves were charged with drawing it up [48]. Unsurprisingly, the 
1842 Pomare Code did proscribe same-sex sexual activity [49]. The missionaries went further and 
even tried to partially entrench this provision, and the 1842 Code as a whole, by shielding it from 
repeal other than by the Tahitian Legislative Assembly: ‘If the Queen or any other powerful person 
repeals a law, that is in itself a violation of the law’ ([48], p. 83).  
The last session of the Tahitian Legislative Assembly, which had begun its meetings in 1824, was 
in 1866 [48]. That year French laws replaced Tahitian laws except in the area of land law [52]. This 
means that the biblically-inspired legal proscription of same-sex sexuality instigated by the 
missionaries gave way, a mere 24 years later, to the secular liberal approach of the 1810 French 
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Criminal Code (sodomy laws had been repealed in France in 1791 and the 1810 Code had not  
re-introduce them).  
In sum, any legal preoccupation with male-to-male sexual activity, such as there was in Tahiti, was 
only short-lived, if not altogether lacking. I want to suggest that this fact may have resulted in lower 
levels of collective concern with male same-sex sexual activity in Tahiti compared to O‘ahu: for if it is 
true that male-bodied gender variance in Polynesia is discursively predicated on the putative sexual 
availability of gender-variant people for the enjoyment of non-variant males, it is also true that in 
Tahiti this putative sexual availability has not carried with it criminal connotations. This in itself is 
likely to have resulted in greater social acceptability of māhū in Tahiti than on O‘ahu, for, as Merry 
argues, law’s power as a social discourse is largely about constructing (and effacing) social identities, 
and the ‘most fundamental distinction legal systems draw is that between the criminal and the  
non-criminal’ ([11], p. 262).  
But the lack of crimino-legal salience of the putative sexuality of māhū in Tahiti also means that 
this putative sexuality has not marked their identity to the same extent as that of Hawaiian māhū. To 
put it differently, the fact that law has been for the most part uninterested in the sexual activities of 
Tahitian māhū has contributed to preventing the emergence or consolidation of social perceptions 
about their sexual exceptionalism. Thus, law has made it easier in Tahiti than on O’ahu to come to see 
something other than a particular kind of sexual activity as wholly or mainly definitional of māhū. This 
argument accords with Lacombe’s observation that the integration of māhū into Tahitian society 
appears contingent upon their sexual discretion and indeed a degree of societal reluctance to discuss or 
profess any knowledge about their sexual practices and preferences [16].   
Indeed, in contemporary Tahitian there is a different term—rae-rae—for gender-variant biological 
males whose identity is seen as centred on sexual activity. As a self-identified māhū puts it: 
Mahu are effeminates in a man’s body. I hate the term rae-rae, which appeared in the 1960s, because it 
makes all that we are turn on the idea of sexuality. For mahu, sexuality is by no means the most important 
thing. Our role is another: we bring a little sweetness around us, as a woman would do ([53], my translation).  
The term ‘rae-rae’ had recently entered common parlance when Levy conducted his seminal 
fieldwork in Tahiti in the late 1960s, and seemed to be synonymous with western-style gay identity [42]. 
But, as Elliston clarifies, currently the term designates transgender identities which are seen as centred 
on sexual activity, including prostitution, and western ideas of transsexualism and white femininity [2].  
Elliston argues that Tahitians’ dislike for rae-rae can be explained by the fact that rae-rae 
subjectivity is at odds with Polynesian sex/gender epistemology. This would be so for two reasons. In 
the first place, Elliston argues that gender rather than sexuality is the main organizing principle of 
māhū identity, adding—controversially [14]—that, according to Polynesian understandings, identity is 
first defined in relation to gender and sexual desires are then aligned in accordance with one’s gender 
identity. The conspicuous sexuality of rae-rae would violate this Tahitian epistemological tenet that 
gender is prior to sexuality. Secondly, Elliston argues, in claiming to ‘choose’ a rae-rae gender 
identity, rae-rae discredit the idea, to which Polynesian epistemologies are equally committed, of the 
embeddedness of one’s gender in one’s life history. In short, for Elliston, the subjectivity of rae-rae is 
socially problematic in Tahiti because of its incompatibility with the Polynesian world-view [2].  
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It seems at least as likely, however, that in contemporary Tahiti the unapologetic style of sexuality 
of rae-rae is objectionable because it conflicts with certain aspects of the assimilated Christian sexual 
morality emphasizing sexual modesty and propriety [16].  
7. Conclusions 
In Tahiti, French law, in conjunction with certain social processes (modernisation, urbanisation, 
tourism, the assimilation of Christian values), created the conditions of possibility for a reorganization 
of Polynesian male-bodied gender-variance into two distinct identities—māhū and rae-rae—each 
affording a different set of social options. On O‘ahu, on the other and, a more sexually repressive legal 
history, in conjunction with broadly similar social processes to those at play in Tahiti, precipitated an 
understanding of māhū subjectivity centred on ideas of sexual deviance. This has restricted the range 
of opportunities for social participation afforded to Hawaiian māhū on O‘ahu, all but propelling many 
of them into marginality.  
My argument in this article is not that Tahiti’s legal history since European contact can be credited 
for producing a society that is particularly tolerant of, or even indifferent to, same-sex sexuality. To 
begin with, while it is plausible to assume that law, as an authoritative discourse purporting to express 
the general will, plays an important role in legitimising and de-legitimising particular social identities, 
it goes without saying that it interacts with other competing discourses and dynamics, which may pull 
in opposite directions. Furthermore, I did not argue that Tahitian society is considerably more liberal 
towards same-sex sexual activity than Hawaiian society: rather, I have tried to make the different point 
that the law is likely to have contributed to the sexualisation of māhū identity on O‘ahu in a way that it 
has not in Tahiti.  
Indeed, although there is significant evidence of the acceptability of same-sex sexual activity and 
relationships in both ancient Tahiti and Hawai‘i, to claim that contemporary Tahitian society is 
especially welcoming of, or unconcerned with, same-sex sexuality runs counter to socio-linguistic 
evidence. In particular, it runs counter to the coinage (at some point after the first occurrence of the 
neologism rae-rae in the 1960s) of the disparaging term petea, which refers to male-bodied individuals 
having sex with, or sexually desiring, each other. Elliston argues that this linguistic development must 
be read partly in light of a politics of Polynesian self-determination, as the term applies mainly to gay 
men, whose identity is seen as a French import [2].  
A similar dynamic is at play in respect of rae-rae: the ‘purity’ of māhū identity, in the sense of it 
being untouched by western sexual identities and forms, appears to be a mainstay of French Polynesian 
discourse about māhū, partly accounting for the social respect that māhū, unlike rae-rae, command. 
Yet it is unlikely that Tahitian māhū identity has not, at least in part, been reworked as a result of 
Tahitian society becoming exposed to Western gender norms.  
Consider the quote reported above, by a Tahitian māhū, to the effect that the role of māhū is to 
bring with them the sweetness of a woman’s touch [53]. While the association between women and 
sweetness conforms to still current western understandings of femininity, it is unclear that it reflects 
traditional Tahitian understandings of gender. For example, Oliver, in his study of ancient Tahitian 
society, did note that apparently women ‘were attributed with stronger and more sensitive “internal” 
reactions to felicity and tragedy’, and that in stories they were more likely to show ‘tender-
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heartedness’, while men “were provided with more violent and picturesque conventions for expressing 
“anger” and “rage”’ ([41], p. 598). However, he also qualifies these claims in several and significant 
ways, for instance by describing Tahitian men as free to indulge in ‘tears and raptures’([41], p. 599); 
by noting that Tahitian tales also knew ‘many malicious female spirits’ ([41], p. 1134); and by pointing 
out that ‘there is no indication that [females] were permitted conventionally any more display of fear 
than were males’, nor expected any more display of stoicism ([41], p. 599). In the 1890s US historian 
Henry Adams similarly de-emphasised temperamental gender differences between French Polynesian 
men and women, writing that ‘the Polynesian woman seems to me much like the Polynesian man; the 
difference is not great enough to admit of sentiment, only of physical divergence’ ([42], p. 232). And 
forty years ago Levy, while noting differences in gender roles among Tahitians, wrote that the gender 
differences in behaviour or temperament that we are accustomed to thinking of as natural in the West 
did not seem salient in Tahitian society: ‘Men, for example, are not particularly more aggressive than 
women. Women do not seem to be much “softer” or more “maternal” than men’ ([42], p. 234).  
In short, the sweetness that (some) Tahitian māhū claim as their own distinctive trait may not 
necessarily have been a historical attribute of māhū identity. If Tahitian māhū identity has been 
undergoing a process of change, partially in response to the circulation of western gender norms, then 
this may explain why the benign way in which Tahitians have traditionally looked upon māhū identity 
is currently shifting towards greater ambivalence [4]. Furthermore, Elliston reports that the disparaging 
term petea is now occasionally applied to māhū [2], revealing the existence of a new framework of 
intelligibility that conflates Polynesian gender-variance and gay identity, in ways apparently similar to 
those signalled by the insulting use of the term ‘māhū’ on O‘ahu.  
In both Hawaii and French Polynesia a complex set of factors has been implicated in producing the 
challenges faced by māhū following colonization. This article’s limited ambition has been to 
foreground one such factor—sodomy laws—in the context of O‘ahu, where these challenge appear 
greater than in Tahiti. In this connection, I have argued that sodomy laws, in conjunction with other 
social processes, resulted in the sexualisation of māhū identity on O‘ahu; and that this sexualisation is part 
of the context against which many māhū people’s choice to enter sex-work on O‘ahu becomes intelligible.  
A promising line of inquiry for future research may include an examination of the impact on māhū 
of the erosion of Hawaiian women’s rights following colonization—although this will require a 
nuanced examination of the extent to which māhū’s and cisgender women’s rights, interests, and 
prerogatives, as well as the ways in which they were socially regarded, coincided or diverged in 
Hawaiian society prior to and following colonization.  
The final point I want to emphasise is that my argument that sodomy laws have been one of the 
social determinants of the diminished social status of māhū on O‘ahu should not be taken to mean that 
law seeps into individual consciousness making its value judgements all but irresistible for the 
recipient. Individuals retain agency in engaging with the discourses that constitute them and it is in this 
that the possibility of effective resistance resides. In this respect, it is interesting that, as Murray notes, 
māhū have taken a central role in the movement for the revival of Hawaiian culture [54]. No doubt, 
this is partly because, as the legend associated with the Stones of Life on Kuhio Beach illustrates,  
pre-colonial Polynesian epistemologies offer a formidable discursive resource against transphobia and 
a source of positive empowerment, assisting māhū people in the project of self-definition and in 
negotiating their social participation in contemporary O‘ahu.  
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However, law too, as a socially authoritative discourse capable of making successful claims to truth, 
has an important role to play in undoing the damage wrought upon gender-variant individuals on 
O‘ahu since colonial times. The recent introduction in Hawai‘i of laws prohibiting workplace 
discrimination on the ground of gender identity [55]—premised as it is on the idea of the equal dignity 
of trans and māhū people—is a promising start.  
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